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This 1818 map by John Melish shows St. Louis in the context of Alton, Carondelet, and Cahokia, suggesting the region as 
Clark knew it. (Image: Missouri History Museum)
B Y  A N D R E W  C O O P E R M A N
 The American Revolution is typically viewed as 
primarily an East Coast affair, fought between Americans 
and their French allies on the one hand, and the British and 
their German mercenaries on the other. Certainly, the war 
fought in the East was critical to the creation and survival 
of the United States. But it was the war fought in the West 
that was critical to the growth and development of the 
new republic. In the trans-Appalachian West, Americans 
fought alongside the Spanish while the British employed 
warriors from various tribes of First Nations. These armies 
were much smaller than their eastern counterparts, and so 
too were the battles that they fought. Nevertheless, in the 
West as in the East, Americans acting in conjunction with 
a major European power fought battles that determined the 
future of the United States and the American people.
 One such battle was fought in St. Louis and Cahokia 
on May 26, 1780, and while the Battle of Fort San Carlos 
is little known outside this area, it was tremendously 
important. For it was at Cahokia that George Rogers Clark 
and his mixed force of Anglo-American frontiersmen and 
Illinois French destroyed British plans for a sweep through 
the Mississippi Valley. It was American military control 
of the trans-Appalachian West, tenuous though it was, 
combined with the skill and perseverance of American 
negotiators in Paris, which enabled the newborn United 
States to set its western border on the Mississippi River 
instead of the Appalachian Mountains.1  
 Like the battle itself, the importance of the Village of 
Cahokia to the Patriot cause and the Allied war effort in 
the West is little known. But it was at Cahokia that Clark 
negotiated precious months of peace with regional First 
Nations. It was Cahokia that served as both a shield for 
defense and a staging area for offense. It was Cahokia that 
served as the link between the Americans and their Spanish 
allies. And it was at Cahokia that a trans-Appalachian 
America was secured.
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Cahokia
 Cahokia was founded by the Seminary Priests of the 
Foreign Mission of Quebec in January of 1699. It was the 
first permanent French settlement in the Mid-Mississippi 
Valley, and today it is the oldest town on the Mississippi 
River. The Seminary Priests came to preach the gospel 
to the Cahokia and Tamaroa Indians, members of the 
Illiniwek Confederacy. Over time the priests were joined 
by fur traders and farmers. Close to the mouths of the 
Missouri and Illinois rivers, Cahokia was an excellent 
location for the fur trade, and the fertile valley in which 
it lay, eventually known as the American Bottoms, made 
Cahokia ideal for farming. Joining the Illiniwek and the 
French Canadians were enslaved Africans.2
 This mixed community suffered a double blow in 
the mid-1760s. First, as a result of the French and Indian 
War, France ceded much of her North American empire, 
including the Illinois Country, in 1763. Cahokia was 
now a possession of England, the ancient enemy of the 
Gallic people. England was also a Protestant nation, often 
hostile to Catholicism and Catholics. The priests sold their 
property in Cahokia and crossed the Mississippi River to 
what had become Spanish Upper Louisiana. They were 
soon followed by many other residents of Cahokia, all 
seeking refuge in the territory of Catholic Spain.3
 The second blow came when Pierre Leclede and 
Auguste Chouteau founded a fur trading post almost 
directly across the Mississippi River from Cahokia in 
February of 1764. St. Louis almost immediately ended 
Cahokia’s role in the fur trade. No longer an active 
Catholic mission or a center of the fur trade, Cahokia 
became primarily an agricultural community. This was the 
town that Capt. Joseph Bowman and his 30 mounted “Big 
Knives” entered on July 6, 1778. 
 
George Rogers Clark
& The Western Campaign
 Bowman and his men were part of the small army 
raised by George Rogers Clark in 1778 to fight the 
British and their Indian allies primarily in the Mississippi, 
Wabash, and Ohio River Valleys. Their mission was to 
seize control of strategic locations and thereby thwart raids 
into Kentucky. Clark firmly believed that the very survival 
of the Kentucky settlements depended on offensive rather 
than defensive action. The war had to be taken to the 
enemy. But the authority and resources to raise such a 
force and conduct such a campaign required the consent 
and assistance of Virginia, of which Kentucky was then a 
county.4
 Clark left Kentucky in October of 1777 to appeal to 
Virginia’s government to authorize and support his plan. 
Clark was persuasive in large measure due to his extensive 
cache of intelligence and his ability to connect Kentucky’s 
interests with those of the rest of Virginia. Clark had 
sent spies to the Illinois Country to ascertain British 
strength, French sentiment, Indian intentions, and Spanish 
sympathies. What they learned and what Clark reported 
to the Virginia government was encouraging. British 
strength was based at Detroit, far to the north of Clark’s 
immediate objectives in the Mississippi and Wabash River 
Valleys. Further, they “had but little expectation of a visit 
from us. . . .”5 The Illinois French in those areas were at 
best lukewarm to the British and would likely support the 
Patriot cause. The Indians were indeed intent on attacking 
Kentucky. Lastly, the Spanish in St. Louis appeared 
sympathetic to the Americans despite Spain’s official 
neutrality.6 
 In addition to presenting actionable intelligence, Clark 
also described how Virginia’s more easterly settlements 
would be exposed to Indian attacks if the Kentucky 
settlements were destroyed or abandoned. British-
sponsored Indian attacks on Kentucky had increased 
sharply during 1777, and the Virginia county simply did 
not have the resources to provide for its own defense. If 
assistance from Williamsburg was not forthcoming, then 
these western settlements would either be destroyed or 
abandoned, leaving more easterly settlements open to 
attack. It was therefore in Virginia’s interests to support her 
most western county in its hour of need.  
 Clark presented his plan to Governor Patrick Henry 
George Rogers Clark (1752–1818) was the second-oldest 
brother of explorer and Missouri territorial governor William 
Clark.  As a Brigadier General in the Virginia militia, he 
was the highest-ranking American officer in the Ohio Valley 
during the War of Independence.  Debts he incurred during 
the war to supply his troops left his personal finances in ruins 
for the rest of his life.  George Catlin painted this miniature 
portrait on ivory from an earlier portrait. (Image: Missouri 
History Museum)
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on December 10, 1777. Henry approved the plan, as did 
Virginia’s Council, on January 2, 1778, while the General 
Assembly authorized the creation of a force “to march 
against and attack any of our western enemies.” Clark was 
commissioned a lieutenant colonel in the Virginia regular 
army (as opposed to militia) and given wide-ranging 
discretion to conduct the campaign as he saw fit.7
 Clark’s first objective was to actually raise an army. 
Recruiting was somewhat less than successful, and Clark 
eventually had to settle for a force of only 175 men 
instead of the 350 to 500 he had originally envisioned. 
Clark compensated for this by instilling a bit of military 
discipline and rigorously training what troops he did 
have. The small army, referred to as the “Big Knives” 
by the First Nations and the Illinois French, left Corn 
Island, future site of Louisville, on June 24, 1778. Its first 
objective was the de facto capitol of the British Illinois 
Country: Kaskaskia. 
 Clark captured Kaskaskia on the evening of July 4, 
1778. Lacking a sizable army, Clark used speed, surprise, 
and psychology to subdue the Illinois French residents 
of the village. Clark’s use of psychology to first instill 
fear of his men and then support for the Patriot cause was 
masterful. The residents of Kaskaskia quickly and eagerly 
joined Clark, Virginia, and the United States, taking a 
loyalty oath on July 5. With Kaskaskia secure, Clark 
ordered Capt. Bowman and a company of 30 mounted 
men to ride north and take control of Prairie du Rocher, St. 
Philippe, and Cahokia.8
 Bowman and his men, joined by local Illinois French, 
rode out of Kaskaskia on July 5. Both Prairie du Rocher 
and St. Philippe fell quickly. Like Clark, Bowman used 
speed and surprise to good effect. But he also had several 
residents of Kaskaskia to vouch for his good intentions and 
the Patriot cause. The residents of both Prairie du Rocher 
and St. Philippe surrendered quickly and as Bowman 
wrote, “were willing to comply with any terms I should 
propose.”9 
 So it was that the Americans rode into Cahokia 
on July 6. According to Bowman, “We rode up to 
the commander’s house and demanded a surrender. 
He accordingly surrendered himself, likewise all the 
inhabitants of the place.” But whereas the residents 
of Kaskaskia, Prairie du Rocher, and St. Philippe had 
surrendered immediately and unconditionally, the people 
of Cahokia were a bit more difficult for the Big Knives to 
bend to their will. Bowman continues: “I then demanded 
of them to take the oath of fidelity to the states, otherwise 
I should treat them as enemies. They told me they would 
give me an answer next morning.” Adding to Bowman’s 
worries that first night, “there was a man in the town 
who would call in one hundred and fifty Indians to his 
assistance and cut me off. This fellow I took care to 
secure; but we lay upon our arms the whole of the night. . 
. .” Fortunately, Bowman and his men “took possession of 
a strong stone house, well fortified for war,” and thus had a 
secure place to lay upon their arms.10 
 The next morning, the villagers agreed to take the 
oath of allegiance to Virginia and the United States, having 
made their point by waiting some 12 hours to do so. Even 
so, according to Clark, “some Individuals said that the 
Town was given up too tamely. . . .”11 This was the first, 
but by no means the last, time that the people of Cahokia 
demonstrated an independent streak. 
 As commanding officer in Cahokia, Bowman was 
responsible for both military and civilian affairs. His first 
priority was to provide for the defense of the village. The 
old ramshackle French fort that once stood where Village 
Hall is today had been quickly replaced by the British 
in 1765 by the stone rectory which stood in what is now 
called the Cahokia Wedge. Like his British predecessors, 
Bowman decided to use this “strong stone house” as a fort. 
Repairs were made, and the building was christened Fort 
Bowman, the Revolution’s westernmost American fort. 
In addition, the local militia was mustered into American 
service.12 Having settled military matters, Bowman turned 
to civil affairs. He organized a local court, and he was 
elected its first president. This court met in the home of 
Francois Saucier; the building was later purchased by St. 
Clair County to serve as the first county courthouse in 
the first county of what became the State of Illinois. The 
building still stands, and it is open to the public as the 
Cahokia Courthouse State Historic Site.13  
 Most of the Illinois French had indeed swung to the 
Patriot cause. Now Clark had to come to terms with the 
various First Nations of the Mid-Mississippi Valley and 
surrounding areas. Many of these tribes began to gather 
at Cahokia to treat with Clark and his Big Knives. A 
conference between Clark and the Indians at Cahokia was 
organized in August. The location of these discussions 
was more than likely near Fort Bowman. Indeed, we know 
that many Indians were camped at the eastern end of the 
Cahokia Wedge before and during their meetings with 
Clark.14
 Regardless of the exact location, the “amazing 
number” of assembled Indians significantly outnumbered 
Clark and his small force.15 Clark once again used 
psychology to compensate for a lack of troops. The 
American commander stressed that he was seeking neither 
peace nor war, but instead desired to know which of the 
two the Indians intended. He emphasized that he respected 
them as men and as warriors, and as such expected them to 
speak truthfully and live by whichever decision they made. 
But he also emphasized that the British had misled the 
Indians regarding both the Americans’ and London’s true 
intentions. Clark maintained that Americans only wanted 
the freedom to govern themselves, while the British were 
using the various tribes to fight their war for them. Clark’s 
credibility was supported by the Spanish. “The friendly 
correspondence between the Spaniards and ourselves was 
also much to our advantage, since everything the Indians 
heard from them was favorable to us,” Clark wrote in his 
memoir.16 
 This combination of bluff, bravado, respect, appeal to 
self interest, and Spanish support worked. Despite a failed 
attempt by some Indians to kidnap him, Clark’s conference 
was a great success. During the five weeks he spent at 
Cahokia, the American commander negotiated peace with 
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at least ten of the First Nations that were represented there. 
These peace agreements neutralized a large number of 
potential British recruits.17 The local Illinois French largely 
supported the Patriot cause, and now many Indians swore 
peace and neutrality. Clark’s success with these two groups 
was mirrored by his success with a third important player 
in the Mid-Mississippi Valley: Spain.  
Spanish-American Contacts & Relations
 Clark’s intelligence from St. Louis proved accurate. 
Local Spanish officials were indeed sympathetic to Clark 
and his army. “Our friends, the Spanyards, [did] everything 
in their power to convince me of their friendship,” Clark 
wrote to a friend.18 This was especially true of the Spanish 
Lt. Gov. Fernando de Leyba. Immediately following 
Bowman’s successful occupation of Cahokia, de Leyba 
sent him a message of congratulations and welcome. He 
also wrote a similar letter to Clark in Kaskaskia. Clark 
responded to de Leyba with a July 13 letter in which he 
expressed his thanks and hope for continued friendship 
between Americans and Spaniards: “Dear Sir, I received 
your letter of the 8th Instant and with pleasure read the 
contints wherein you expressed the deepest sentiments 
of your real Friendship to me and the American Cause 
a Friendship that is valuable to us. We have already 
The Revolutionary War in the trans-Appalachian West was marked by skirmishes between smaller forces and Native 
Americans whom the British convinced to side with them against the Americans, as this map suggests. (Image: Albert 
Bushnell, The American Nation, vol. 14, 1906)
Clark was known as the “Hannibal of the West” by the end 
of the Revolutionary War, and he remained a heroic figure, 
as is seen by his commemoration on this stamp marking the 
150th anniversary of his victory at Vincennes. (Image: U.S. 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing)
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experienced it and hope to Merit a Continuation thereof.” 
He was especially grateful for de Leyba’s “treatment to 
Captain Bowman and Speaches to the Savages in favour of 
us.”19  
 These letters were the beginning of an important 
working relationship between the Americans and Spanish 
in the Mid-Mississippi Valley. This relationship was 
described in an April 23, 1779, letter from de Leyba to 
Patrick Henry: “From the time that my friend Colonel 
Clark arrived in this place, fraternal harmony has reigned 
between the people from the United States and the 
vassals of his Catholic Majesty.”20 And as Clark wrote 
in his memoir, “Friendly correspondence which at once 
commenced between the Spanish officers and ourselves 
added much to the general tranquility and happiness.”21 
This friendship was especially true of Clark and de Leyba 
themselves. Clark was a frequent guest of de Leyba in 
St. Louis, and a close working relationship between 
the two was forged by these visits and a continuous 
correspondence.
 Spanish friendship though was also very much 
based on Spanish interests. Even before Clark and his 
army arrived in the Illinois Country, the Spanish were 
considering their options vis-à-vis the British Empire. 
The British had held Gibraltar since 1713, and they had 
taken Majorca in the Mediterranean and Florida in North 
America as a result of the late French and Indian War. 
Spanish calculations in the Mississippi Valley were but 
one part of a much larger Spanish strategy. The goal of 
that strategy was to return those lost lands to Spain and 
to expand Spain’s position in the Mississippi Valley.22 
During the late 1770s and early 1780s, this goal meshed 
reasonably well with the American goal of independence. 
Bernardo de Galvez, Spanish Governor of Louisiana, 
instructed de Leyba to assist Clark as much as possible, 
but in secret. He also allowed Oliver Pollock, purchasing 
agent for both the Continental Congress and Virginia 
in New Orleans, to conduct his operations in Spanish 
territory freely. Of course, neither act was in keeping with 
Spain’s official position of neutrality.23 
 Clark’s ultimate goal was to take Detroit. It was the 
most important British post in the West, and it served as a 
garrison town, supply depot, and meeting place for British 
officers and their Indian allies. Clark believed that if he 
could take Detroit, he could largely neutralize British 
efforts in the western theater of the war. However, Clark’s 
plans for a strike at Detroit were subordinated to the need 
to expel the British from Fort Sackville, which the British 
had retaken in December of 1778. Clark’s expedition to 
Vincennes included many Cahokia residents who were 
eager to remove the British from Fort Sackville, and thus 
remove a major threat to their community. 
 Once Vincennes was back in American hands, Clark 
again planned an expedition against Detroit. As he did 
before his move into the Illinois Country, Clark sought 
to gather intelligence on the lands he intended to enter. 
To that end, he ordered Capt. Godefroy Linctot to take 
his company of Cahokia volunteers north and scout the 
Illinois River Valley and beyond. In a June 1779 letter to 
Linctot, Clark ordered him “to take Charge of a Volunteer 
Company raised at Cahos and march by way of the Illinois 
River to the British post Called Ome (on the Miami 
River) which I make no doubt but that you can easily get 
possession of by which Means you probably may be safe 
while you have an opportunity of treating with the Indians 
in that Quarter. . . .”24 Unfortunately for Clark, the British 
were planning offensive operations of their own. 
Battle of Ft. San Carlos
 Spain’s entry into the war in 1779 added another 
factor to British strategic planning in the trans-
Appalachian West. While still a major European power, 
Spain’s resources in this particular theater of the war 
were quite limited. Very few troops from the Louisiana 
Regiment were stationed in Upper Louisiana, leaving 
defense primarily to local militia, and the Spanish fort at 
the mouth of the Missouri River was literally falling down. 
In this 1804 scene of St. Louis as it appeared from Illinois, Fort San Carlos can be seen in the center.  (Image: Missouri 
History Museum)
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Further, the Spanish had been assisting Clark and his men 
since their arrival in 1778, but the official peace between 
Great Britain and Spain had limited the British response. 
Now, with war officially declared, the British could reduce 
if not eliminate Spanish assistance to the rebels, as well as 
force open the rich fur trade of the Missouri River Valley, 
long closed to British traders by Spanish regulations.25 
The attack on St. Louis and Cahokia was thus part of a 
multipronged offensive planned to sweep through the 
Mississippi Valley. The timing could not have been better 
for the British or worse for the Allies. The British had 
spent considerable time courting various First Nations, 
and as a result they could recruit hundreds of warriors to 
their colors. Conversely, Spanish and American forces 
in the Mississippi Valley were weak and spread thinly 
among various forts and settlements. Further, Clark was 
preoccupied with building Fort Jefferson. Located on the 
Mississippi River south of the Ohio, Clark planned to 
concentrate what troops he did have at the new post once 
it was complete. Both Spanish forces in St. Louis and 
American forces in Cahokia would have to rely on local 
Illinois French militia to flesh out their thin ranks.26  
 Further, the “Hard Winter” of 1779–1780 was the 
most severe in years. Ice and snow covered much of the 
country from the Great Lakes to Virginia. Game became 
scarce, livestock died, and food stores dwindled. Both 
civilians and soldiers suffered during these bitterly cold 
months. The only benefit of this severe weather was that 
it curtailed the military activities of the British and their 
Indian allies.27
 But while the British were relatively quiet in the West, 
they were shifting their primary focus of the war in the 
East to the southern states, including Virginia. This meant 
that the Old Dominion had even fewer resources to send 
west as it faced British troops in the east. In New Orleans, 
Oliver Pollock had gone bankrupt trying to supply Clark, 
and he could no longer support the small American force 
in the Mississippi Valley. Clark’s army was cold and short 
of supplies, and desertion was becoming a problem.28  
 Unhappily for the British, these advantages were 
negated by one major disadvantage: the loss of the element 
of surprise. Word of the impending attack reached St. 
Louis and Cahokia long before the British attack force 
arrived. This gave the Allies time to prepare their defenses. 
Col. John Montgomery, American military commander 
in the Illinois Country, responded to the situation 
as best he could. In a May 15, 1780, letter to Clark, 
Montgomery stated that “the Bad nues . . . Compelled 
Me to March with out loss of Time to the asistance of the 
inhabetents of Kaho. . . .” Luckily for Montgomery, his 
small force included many “inhabetents of Kaho [w]ho 
have Digtinguished them Selves More like Vetrons than 
ondesiplened men and are Redy to turn out to a man to Go 
Any Where the[y] are Requested.”29 Despite the skill and 
reliability of his Cahokia militia, if Montgomery stood 
a chance of successfully defending the village he would 
have to be reinforced before the hammer fell. Some help 
did come in early May when Capt. John Rogers arrived 
with a company of mounted Virginians. Rogers and his 
men made repairs to Fort Bowman and “Put it in Some 
Poster of Defence.”30   
 As the situation worsened, Cahokia appealed to 
Clark, now a full colonel, for assistance. The Board of 
Magistrates sent Charles Gratiot, a Swiss-born Cahokia 
resident and prominent merchant, to present Clark with a 
letter dated April 11 in which the magistrates explained the 
village’s desperate situation: “We are on the eve of being 
attacked in our village by considerable parties of savages 
and will not be able to work at the cultivation of our 
fields, if we do not have prompt succor. . . .” Their letter 
also reflected the “Hard Winter” as they went on to write, 
“but what afflicts us the most is this, that in case you send 
us many men, we should not have the provisions which 
would be necessary for them. . . .”31 One the signatories of 
this letter was Pierre Martin, whose house still stands in 
Prairie du Pont just south of Cahokia. In a May 11, 1780, 
letter to Oliver Pollock, Clark reflected on the gravity of 
the situation: “The Illenois Settlement are much threatened 
by the British Gentlemen at Detroit. . . .”32 
 On May 15, Montgomery and Rogers crossed the 
Col. John Montgomery (c. 1750–1794) served with George 
Rogers Clark in the Illinois Country in the War of American 
Independence. Montgomery came by his revolutionary 
credentials honestly; he was one of the 13 signers of the 
Fincastle Resolutions, in which the elected representatives of 
Fincastle County, Virginia Colony, told Virginia’s delegation 
to the First Continental Congress of their support of breaking 
with the British Crown in January 1775. (Image: Nashville 
CivicScope)
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Mississippi from Cahokia to St. Louis to confer with de 
Leyba on how to respond to the threat with a combined 
and coherent strategy. Perhaps reflecting Clark’s tactical 
thinking, Montgomery suggested that the Allies strike first. 
De Leyba agreed, promising Spanish support for such a 
campaign. However, the American delay in obtaining boats 
and provisions for the expedition resulted in the attack on 
St. Louis and Cahokia occurring before Montgomery was 
able to move.33    
 The British force that attacked Cahokia and St. Louis 
on May 26, 1780, was composed primarily of warriors 
from various First Nations and commanded by Emmanuel 
Hesse. In a February 17, 1780, letter to his superiors, 
Michilimackinac Lt. Gov. Patrick Sinclair described 
Hesse as “a Trader and a man of character (formerly in the 
60th Regt). . . .”34 Thus Hesse was familiar with Britain’s 
Indian allies and frontier warfare, and he was deemed 
reliable. The Indians he commanded largely came from 
the Sauk and Fox, Menominee, Winnebago, and Ojibwe 
nations. Hesse and his force left Michilimackinac on 
March 10 and moved south to Prairie du Chien. There 
Hesse recruited more men. On May 2, Hesse and his force 
of approximately 1,000 left Prairie du Chien and headed 
south toward St. Louis and Cahokia.35 
 Both Montgomery and de Leyba sent dispatches to 
Clark requesting that he leave Fort Jefferson and march 
north to aid in the defense of Cahokia and St. Louis. Clark 
arrived in Cahokia on May 25, and he immediately crossed 
the Mississippi River to confer with de Leyba in St. Louis. 
Afterwards, he returned to Cahokia to supervise its defense 
against approximately 300 warriors led by Jean Marie 
Ducharme.36 
 There is precious little in the primary sources which 
describes the fighting at Cahokia. One such document 
is a letter from Montgomery to the Honorable Board of 
Commissioners for the Settlement of Western Accounts 
dated February 22, 1783. In it, Montgomery gives a brief 
description of events:
In the Spring of 1780, we were threatened with 
an Invasion. Genl: Clark [promoted in 1781] 
being informed of it Hurreyed his departure with 
a small body of troops to the Falls of the mouth 
of the Ohio, when he received other expresses 
from the Spanish Comm’dts and myself, luckily 
joined me at Cohos, time enough to save the 
country from Impending ruin, as the Enimy 
appeared in great force within twenty-four hours 
after his arrival. Finding that they were likely to 
be disappointed in their Design, they retired after 
doing some mischief on the Span’h shore, . . .37
In a September 1780 letter, the Cahokians themselves 
described how the Indians’ “slack manner of making war” 
resulted in little “carnage in our country.”38 
 While Clark’s force and the residents of Cahokia did 
not suffer the losses that St. Louis did, there were losses 
nonetheless. According to a July 8, 1780, letter by Sinclair, 
“The Rebels lost an officer and three men killed at the 
Cahokias & five Prisoners.”39  With the fighting at Cahokia 
and St. Louis over, the Indian force retreated north. The 
Mississippi Valley component of the British offensive 
collapsed. Soon, the entire offensive ground to a halt. Once 
it had, Clark again turned his attention to Detroit. Included 
in his calculations was the possible inclusion of Spanish 
troops in such a campaign. 
Spanish-American
Combined Operations
 After successfully defending Cahokia, Clark returned 
to Fort Jefferson. Before leaving, he issued orders to 
Montgomery to counterattack the Indians who had just 
attacked Cahokia. Specifically, Montgomery was to pursue 
the retreating Indians, degrade that force when and where 
possible, and destroy the primary Sauk and Fox towns. 
Montgomery’s force of approximately 350 men contained 
Cahokia militia as well as 100 Spanish troops, making this 
an Allied offensive. The resulting Rock River Expedition 
illustrated that Spanish and American commanders 
could cooperate on offensive as well as on defensive 
operations.40 
 Describing the expedition in a September 21, 1780, 
letter to Augustin Mottin de la Balme, a former French 
officer who claimed to act on behalf of the King of France, 
the “Inhabitants of Cahokia” recounted the beginning of 
the campaign: “Oh, Colonel Clark, affecting always to 
desire our public welfare and under pretext of avenging 
us, soon formed with us conjointly with the Spaniards a 
party of more than three hundred men to go and attack in 
their own village the savages who had come to our homes 
to harass us, and after substituting Colonel Montgomery to 
command in his place, he soon left us.”41
 Montgomery wrote that after receiving his instructions 
from Clark, he “immediately proceeded to the Business I 
was order’d and march’d three hundred and fifty men to 
the Lake open on the Illinois River, and from thence to the 
Rock River, Destroying the Towns and crops proposed, the 
Enimy not daring to fight. . . .”42
 While Montgomery seemed satisfied with the 
campaign’s outcome, the Cahokians’ experience in the 
Rock River Expedition must have left something to be 
desired. In the same letter to Mottin de la Balme quoted 
above, the “Inhabitants of Cahokia” described in detail the 
shortcomings of the Anglo-American forces: “It is then, 
well to explain to you, sir, that the Virginians, who never 
employed any principle of economy, have been the cause 
by their lack of management and bad conduct, of the non-
success of the expedition and that our glorious projects 
have failed through their fault: for the savages abandoned 
their nearest villages, where we have been, and we were 
forced to stop and not push on further, since we had almost 
no more provisions, powder, balls, which the Virginians 
had undertaken to furnish us.”43 This letter again illustrates 
the independence of thought and opinion that characterized 
the residents of Cahokia.
 But the unsatisfactory experience with the Rock River 
campaign, organized and commanded by Americans, did 
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not deter Cahokians from cooperating with their neighbors 
to the west. Spanish troops and Cahokia militia cooperated 
in patrolling the areas north of Cahokia and St. Louis. In 
August 1780, these patrols repulsed an Indian probe into 
their area of operations.44 
 Cahokians also joined an expedition led by Mottin de 
la Balme. The goal of his expedition north was to attack 
Detroit. If Clark and his Virginians could not achieve 
this, then perhaps this representative of the former mother 
country could. Mottin de la Balme and his mixed force of 
Illinois French and Indians got as far as the headwaters of 
the Maumee River where the Frenchman and most of his 
troops were killed by Miami warriors. Before his death, 
Mottin de la Balme had detached a small force of Cahokia 
French to attack the British post at St. Joseph, modern-day 
Niles, Michigan. Their attack was successful, and the post 
was destroyed. But the Cahokians themselves were then 
attacked by a party of British traders and Potawatomi.  
Only three of them returned home.45 This defeat moved 
the residents of Cahokia to strike at St. Joseph once again. 
However, the new expedition would include their allies 
from across the river. 
 In St. Louis, Lt. Gov. Francisco Cruzat, who had 
replaced the deceased de Leyba in September 1780, 
authorized a Spanish expedition against St. Joseph. 
He appointed Capt. Eugenio Pierra (Eugene Pourré) to 
organize and command this campaign. Pierra raised a 
mixed force of 65 Spanish militia, 60 Indians, and 20 
Cahokia French. Pierra and his men left St. Louis on 
January 2, 1781, and arrived at St. Joseph on the 12th. Only 
a few British traders and Indians were present, and the 
Spanish-led force had no difficulty taking the post. Pierra 
and his men wasted little time in destroying St. Joseph 
and returning to St. Louis.46 Ominously for the future of 
Spanish-American relations, Pierra raised the Spanish flag 
over the post and claimed the region for Spain.
Conclusion
 Pierra’s action at St. Joseph foreshadowed over a 
century of Spanish-American rivalry that stretched from 
the Mississippi Valley to South America.47 However, 
Spanish-American cooperation during the Revolutionary 
War, especially at the Battle of Fort San Carlos, secured 
the Northwest Territory and a Mississippi River boundary 
for the new nation when peace finally came in 1783. 
 Clark’s successful campaign in the trans-Appalachian 
West was in large part made possible by Spanish assistance 
and cooperation. Like the French in the East, the Spanish 
in the West were of critical importance in securing 
American victory. Spanish supplies, Spanish troops, and 
Spanish diplomatic support with the Indians not only 
enabled Clark and his small army to successfully occupy 
and defend the old French villages of Cahokia, Vincennes, 
and Kaskaskia, but also to use them as staging areas to 
strike at the British and their First Nation allies further 
north.  
 Of particular importance to Clark was the financing 
of his army and its operations. This was largely done by 
Oliver Pollock in New Orleans. Pollock used his personal 
wealth as collateral for purchases of Spanish goods made 
by Virginia and the United States. But it was Pollock’s 
personal connections to Spanish officials, including 
governors, which made these purchases possible. In an 
April 22, 1788, letter to Pollock, William Heth stated: 
“There is no circumstance of which I am more convinced 
than that the conquest of the Illinois country could not 
have been maintained by Virginia and that consequently 
that it would not now form part of the United States 
if it had not been for your assistance and very liberal 
advances.”48 Heth was one of three commissioners 
appointed to sort out the debts owed to New Orleans 
merchants contracted by Pollock on behalf of Virginia 
and Congress. Pollock’s personal wealth and connections 
served Clark and the Patriot cause in the West extremely 
well. 
 The role of Cahokia and its people in the western 
theater of the Revolutionary War was also important. 
Cahokia was the site of Clark’s Indian conference that 
bought precious months of peace which enabled the 
Americans to secure their position in the Illinois County. 
The village’s location near St. Louis enabled American 
commanders to maintain regular contact with their Spanish 
allies. Officers stationed at Fort Bowman in Cahokia 
were often in St. Louis conferring with their Spanish 
counterparts. Cahokia’s location also made it an ideal spot 
from which to launch operations to the north, and to act 
as a shield for the villages further south. The people of 
Cahokia themselves gave valuable service to the Patriot 
cause and the Allied war effort by fighting in several 
engagements and under a variety of commanders: the 
American Clark, the Frenchman Mottin de la Balme, and 
the Spaniard Pierra.   
 It was also at Cahokia, and St. Louis, that the 
Americans, Spanish, and the Illinois French broke the 
grand British offensive of 1780. The Battle of Fort San 
Carlos left British operations in the West in shambles. The 
war wound down and ended before another attempt could 
be made to drive the Americans and the Spanish from the 
Mississippi Valley. This in turn left Virginia and the United 
States in possession of the lands between the Appalachian 
Mountains and the Mississippi River. Though their actual 
control of these lands was tenuous, Clark’s western 
campaign and his defense of Cahokia on May 26, 1780, 
gave the United States the ability to successfully press 
its claims to this territory during peace negotiations with 
the British. Virginia governor Benjamin Harrison testified 
to this in a July 2, 1783, letter to Clark: “[M]y thanks 
and those of my Council for the very great and singular 
services you have rendered your Country, in wresting so 
great and valuable a territory out of the hands of the British 
Enemy, repelling the attacks of their savage allies, and 
carrying on successful war in the heart of their country.”49 
Thus, in conjunction with his Spanish allies and with the 
aid of the village and people of Cahokia, George Rogers 
Clark and his army of “Big Knives” secured an America 
not bound to the Atlantic seaboard.  
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